Indiana Sexual Psychopath Statute by unknown
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 25 | Issue 2 Article 4
Winter 1950
Indiana Sexual Psychopath Statute
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Law and Psychology Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation




INDIANA SEXUAL PSYCHOPATH STATUTE
Following the recent trend in other jurisdictions the Eighty-sixth
Session of the General Assembly of Indiana enacted a statute providing for
the commitment of criminal sexual psychopaths.' This legislation manifests
an increasing awareness of the social problems presented by the tendency of
these offenders toward recidivism of a serious nature as well as the inade-
quacy of conventional criminal prosecution in dealing with them.2 As
scientific knowledge of the underlying causes of this type of mental deficiency
has increased, the short comings of the criminal law; the need for proper
protection of society; and the necessity for adequate care of the individual,
have been pointed out with increasing clamor by members of the medical
and legal professions.'
Due to the constitutional limitations on a criminal action4 the ultimate
validity of such a statute depends, in large measure, upon the judicial determi-
nation of whether the proceeding under the act is criminal or civil. The
essential difference between the two proceedings should be determined by
considering the object to be attained, rather than an abstraction drawn from
1. Ind. Acts 1949, c. 124, p. 328.
2. In 14 OREG. L. Rav. 352 (1935) Dr. H. H. Dixon states:
The psychopath does not learn by experience, and will almost invariably
repeat. Because of this, punishment does not alter his attitude and the
lack in his emotional makeup is in no way altered by reasoning or punish-
ment. Ahy attempt at punishment, followed by parole, results only in
repetition of their criminal behavior. When this type of behavior is once
crystalized, the alternative appears to be permanent custody . . . Since
this individual can be readily diagnosed society would be saved much
distress by early institutionalization. In early cases we can correct the
factors leading to the personality distortion.
See also 25 MENTAL HYGIENE 76. But see the report of the New Jersey Com MIssIoN FOR
THE INVESTIGATION OF THE HABITUAL SEX OFFENDER, which was submitted to the Legis-
lature Feb. 1, 1950. This report concluded that the average sex offender is a mild-
mannered, much-maligned, and non-dangerous person who seldom repeats his offenses
and that progression from minor to major sex crimes is rare.
3. GLUECI, MENTAL DISORDER AND CRIMINAL LAW (1925); Mullins, How Should
the Sexual Offender be Dealt With?, 2 MEDIco-LEGAL & CRIr. REv. 236 (1934) ; Weiho-
fen, lnsanity as a Defense in Criminal Law (1933) ; 14 ORE. L. REV. 352 (1935). Critics
have offered alternative proposals to meet the problem of the sex offender. See Report
of Committee on Forensic psychiatry, Circular letter 131, Feb. 12, 1949; Karpman, Sex
Life in Prison, 38 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 475 (1948).
4. In a note, 3 JOHN MARSHALL L. J. 407 (1938) the writer adopts a distinct minority
view and discusses the constitutional limitations on the Illinois Sexual Psychopathic Statute
as though it were a criminal proceeding.
NOTE
the form of the proceeding." The result sought in a criminal action is the
punishment or fine of the offender for a public wrong.' The sexual psycho-
pathic proceeding is conducted for the benefit of the person whose mental
state is in question as well as for the protection of society and the end to be
achieved is not essentially a punative sanction to exact retribution from the
unfortunate person.7
The courts have upheld analogous proceedings for the commitment of the
insane,8 feeble-minded, 9 drug addicts,"0 dipsomaniacs,"1 inebriates 2 and de-
fective delinquents' as civil inquests, leaving the determination of the condi-
tion to persons possessing the necessary education and experience.'4 The
legislatures passing these statutes recognized the futility of criminal prosecu-
tion and punishment to reform these offenders and substituted provisions
providing for special judicial handling and treatment of them following com-
mitment. The Indiana statute covers a segment of society requiring similar
consideration.
A Iichigan sexual psychopathic statute was held unconstitutional on the
5. Boyd v. U. S., 116 U. S. 616 (1885) ; Amato v. Porter, 157 F.2d 719 (10th Cir.
1947) ; Iowa v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 37 Fed. 497 (S. D. Iowa 1889) ; Illinois v. Illinois
Cent. R. R., 33 Fed. 721 (N. D. IIl. 1888); State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Euclide, 227
Wis. 279, 278 N. W. 535 (1938) ; 16 N. Y. U. L. Q. 303 (1938).
6. Amato v. Porter, 157 F.2d 219 (10th Cir. 1947) ; Lauders v. Staten Island R. R.,
53 N. Y. 450 (1873) ; State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Euclide, 227 Wis. 279, 278 N. W. 535
(1938) ; 24 TEx. L. REv. 307 (1946).
7. In Vona v. State, 54 N. Y. S.2d 453 (1945), the court said the commitment of
a defective delinquent is not a proceeding for the punishment of crime but rather the state
intervenes for the welfare of its wards. In 24 TEx. L. REv. 307 (1946) the writer sug-
gests that a commitment proceeding cannot be considered even a civil trial; "It is a spe-
cial proceeding sui generis conducted primarily for the benefit of the person whose mental
state is in question, and it bears no resemblance to an action either civil or criminal."
See it re Breese, 82 Iowa 573, 48 N. W. 991 (1891) ; It re Cook, 218 N. C. 384, 11 S. E.2d
142 (1940).
8. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns 1933) § 8-202; Emry v. Beaver, 192 Ind. 471, 137 N. E.
55 (1922); Chase v. Chase, 163 Ind. 178, 71 N. E. 485 (1904). People v. Janek, 287
Mich. 563, 283 N. W. 699 (1939), held that a sanity proceeding is not a trial placing a
defendant in double jeopardy, but a collateral inquiry to preserve him from the jeopardy of
a trial while insane.
9. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns 1933) §§ 22-1712, 27-1720; State v. Troxler, 202 Ind.
268, 173 N. E. 321 (1930) ; People v. Niesman, 356 IIl. 322, 190 N. E. 668 (1934) ; Cahalan
v. Dept. of Mental Health, 304 Mass. 360, 23 N. E.2d 918 (1939) ; Ex parte Roberts, 202
Mass. 536, 88 N. E. 927 (1909).
10. CALIF. WELFARE & INSTITUTIONS CODE §§ 5400-5407 (1937) ; Ex Parte Liggett, 187
Cal. 428, 202 Pac. 660 (1921) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-316; It re Hinkle, 33 Idaho 605, 196
Pac. 1035 (1921) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS. 1942 c. 123, § 62.
11. Ibid. See also Goodwin v. State, 95 Ind. 551 (1884), where the court held dip-
somania to be a type of moral insanity; Bradley v. State, 31 Ind. 492 (1870). •
12. See Note 10 supra. Ex parte O'Connor, 29 Cal. App. 225, 155 Pac. 115 (1915);
In re Scrange, 182 Iowa 880, 164 N. W. 778 (1917).
13. MASS. ANN. LAWS (Supp. 1947), c. 123; N. Y. MENTAL DEFICIENcY LAW § 124-
126; Vona v. State, 54 N. Y. S2d 453 (1945).
14. Prescott v. State, 19 Ohio St. 184 (1869) ; 39 CoL. L. REV. 534 (1939) ; 16 N. Y. U.
L. Q. 302 (1939).
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grounds that the legislature, by placing the act in the criminal code and provid-
ing for conviction and sentence on the criminal charge prior to the commit-
ment proceeding, had subjected the defendant to a criminal prosecution. 5
This was said to result in two trials and convictions for the same crime, a
denial of due process, and an attempt to keep the defendant confined under
the police power when he had already been sentenced for the crime. The
Indiana act is not contained in the criminal code and the proceeding must be
instituted prior to sentence on the criminal charge.' 6 The Indiana Act further
stipulates that no person found to be a criminal sexual psychopath may there-
after be tried or sentenced upon the offence with which he originally stood
charged or convicted." The inclusion of these provisions would seem to
obviate the difficulty encountered by the Michigan act, a subsequent version
of which, removing the unconstitutional features of its predecessor, was
upheld as involving a civil proceeding. 8
CLASSIFICATION
A criminal sexual psychopath is defined by the statute as any person
charged with a criminal offence, 9 over the age of sixteen years who is suffer-
ing from a mental disorder and is not insane or feeble-minded, which mental
disorder is coupled with criminal propensities to the commission of sex
offenses.' 0 This provision has been attacked in other jurisdictions as an
arbitrary classification. However, it has been upheld as reasonable and as
not denying due process since the legislature, in the exercise of the police
power, may limit the scope of legislation to those areas where the need is
presumably greatest, even though in practice it results in some inequality.2'
A similar provision in the Illinois statute was sustained as a reasonable classi-
15. People v. Frontczak, 286 Mich. 51, 281 N. W. 534 (1938). The precise ground
of unconstitutionality was that the individual was deprived of the right to jury trial by
a jury from the vicinage. Noted in 37 MicH. L. REv. 613 (1939) ; 18 Micx. STATE B. J.
83 (1939).
16. Ind. Acts 1949, c. 124, § 4.
17. Id. § 9. The Michigan act is similar to the Indiana act in this respect, Mica.
STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1947) § 28.967. However, the Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota and
Massachusetts statutes specifically provide that commitment as a sexually dangerous
person shall not constitute a defense to criminal charges. Seeking to remedy certain ad-
ministrative difficulties the Committee on Criminal Law of the Chicago Bar Association
has proposed a revised version of the Illinois Psychopathic Statute which grants discretion
to the trial judge in considering the time spent in confinement when setting the sentence
for past convictions. 40 J. CaRr. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 186 (1949).
18. People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584, 4 N. W.2d 18 (1943).
19. Ind. Acts 1949, c. 124, § 3. The act excludes the crimes of murder, man-
slaughter or rape of a female child under the age of 12, from its coverage.
20. Ind. Acts 1949, c. 124, § 4.
21. Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 309 U. S. 270
(1939) ; People v. Sims, 382 Ill. 472, 47 N. E.2d 703 (1943) ; People v. Chapman. 301
Mich. 584, 4 N. W.2d 18 (1943).
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fication, the court stating that the purpose of the act was to prevent punish-
ment for crimes during the period of mental illness. Therefore, the provision
for commitment when the psychopath was charged with a crime was not
discriminatory. 2
The Minnesota act defines a psychopathic condition as "the existence
in any person of such conditions of emotional instability, or impulsiveness of
behavior, or lack of customary standards of good judgment, or failure to
appreciate the consequences of his acts, or a combination of such conditions,
as to render such person irresponsible for his conduct with respect to sexual
matters and thereby dangerous to other persons."2 3  The Minnesota court
construed this section as applicable only to persons who "by an habitual course
of misconduct in sexual matters, have evidenced an utter lack of power to
control their sexual impulses and who, therefore, are likely to attack or other-
wise inflict injury, loss, pain or other evil on the objects of their uncontrollable
desire. '2'  This provision, as interpreted, was upheld by the Supreme Court
in Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County25 as a ra-
tional basis for classification and, therefore, not a denial of equal protection
of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It should be noted that the accused is not committed on the basis of
criminal responsibility, but rather because he was found to be a sexual
psychopath during proceedings on the alleged criminal offense.26 Although
a person not so charged cannot be committed, offenders brought within the
court's jurisdiction in this manner are more likely to be those of the general
class of sexual psychopaths, who endanger the safety of society.
DETERMINATION OF CONDITION
After the prosecuting attorney of the county, or someone on behalf of
the person charged, 27 has filed a statement with the court 2 setting forth
facts tending to show that the person is a criminal sexual psychopath, two
22. People v. Sims, 382 Ill. 472, 47 N. E.2d 703 (1943).
23. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 526.09-526.11.
24. State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 205 Minn. 545, 549,
287 N. W. 297, 299 (1939).
25. 309 U. S. 270 (1939).
26. Vona v. State, 54 N. Y. S.2d 453 (1945).
27. The proposed revision of the Illinois statute provides for additional procedural
safeguards to the individual. Only the state's attorney, and in some cases a criminal
court judge, can institute proceedings under the act. This proposed change is to protect
the individual from blackmail and harassment. Also the judge must pass on the suffici-
ency of the petition. These safeguards would seem to be desirable. The Indiana act
grants the court discretionary power to pass on the sufficiency of the petition only when
the petition is filed by someone on behalf of the person charged. The Illinois proposal
would make the right to counsel expressly available to the accused. 40 J. CRIM. L. & CRIM-
INOLOGY 186 (1949). The Indiana act makes no specific provision for counsel.
28. Jurisdiction is vested with courts having general jurisdiction of criminal cases.
Ind. Acts 1949, c. 124, § 2.
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qualified physicians are appointed by the court to make an examination and
submit a report of their findings and conclusions.2 9  Usually any licensed
physician is competent to make such an examination."0 As a practical matter
the Indiana statute may be inadequate in this respect, since some practitioners
possibly lack the experience necessary to competently analyze this type
offender. However, this potential weakness can be offset to a great extent
by the proper exercise of judicial discretion in selecting examiners.3 ' The
United States Supreme Court held that a similar provision in the Minnesota
statute did not deny due process, finding the argument that doctors may not
be sufficiently expert untenable as merely inviting conjecture.32
SELF-INCOIINATION
Under the Indiana statute the accused is required to answer the ques-
tions propounded by the examining physicians under penalty of contempt of
court.33 In Indiana the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination
applies with equal vigor to testimony obtained in either a civil or criminal
proceeding which may expose the accused to criminal prosecution. 4 However,
while the resulting report of the examiners is available to the interested
parties, the Indiana statute forbids its use in any other proceeding against
the accused.33 Although there has been no uniformity of expression as to
what constitutes self-incrimination, 0 the inclusion of this immunity pro-
vision in the statute37 probably eliminates all doubt as to the applicability of
29. Ind. Acts 1949, c. 124, § 4.
30. Weihofen, op. cit. supra note 3, at 202.
31. Most state statutes require the appointment of at least one psychiatrist. The
suggested revision of the Illinois statute provides for additional requirements for examin-
ing psychiatrists. These were suggested to insure the appointment of competent ex-
aminers and to reduce the chances of the judge's appointments on patronage motives.
The criticism has already been made, by some Indiana judges, that competent examiners
are difficult to find, especially in smaller communities. See Indianapolis Star, Nov. 23,
1949, p. 1, col. 5. The best solution would seem to be an official court clinic composed
of specialists on sex offenses. These clinics could be established in the larger cities and
utilized by the surrounding area as well as the city itself. 40 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
186 (1949).
32. Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 309 U. S. 270
(1939).
33. Ind. Acts 1949, c. 124, § 4.
34. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1905) ; Ross v. State, 204 Ind. 281, 182 N. E. 865(1932) ; Overman v. State, 194 Ind. 483, 143 N. E. 604 (1924) ; French v. Venneman, 14
Ind. 282 (1860) ; Wilkins v. Malone, 14 Ind. 153 (1860) ; 2 WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES § 712 (2d. ed. 1929).
35. Ind. Acts 1949, c. 124, § 4.
36. Compare State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N. W. 935 (1902), with State v. Petty,
32 Nev. 384, 108 Pac. 934 (1910). Compare State v. Griffin, 129 S. C. 200, 124 S. E. 81
(1924), with Cooper v. State, 86 Ala. 610, 6 So. 110 (1889). See also 25 MicH. B. J.
169 (1946).
37. Ind. Acts 1949, c. 124, § 4. In 40 3. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 186 (1949), the
writer raises the possibility that a broad grant of immunity, such as the Indiana statute
provides, would encourage sex-offenders to confess all their past offenses during the
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this constitutional proscription. In analogous proceedings similar grants of
immunity have been upheld and the witness compelled to disclose incriminating
information. s Even where no such immunity exists, compulsory examination
provisions in the Illinois and Michigan sexual psychopathic statutes have been
sustained as not being within the scope of this constitutional inhibition,89 as
have similar provisions in insanity and related statutes in other jurisdictions,40
on the grounds that this prohibition applies to criminal actions only.
HEARING
In the event that both physiclans conclude that the person is a criminal
sexual psychopath 4' a hearing, following notice to the person so charged, 42
is held by the court to determine the accused's mental state. The report of
the examiners is advisory and is submitted for the court's guidance to be
considered with other evidence introduced by the parties at the hearing.48
psychiatric examination, thus insuring themselves immunity from subsequent prosecu-
tion. To obviate this difficulty a specific provision might be inserted in the statute order-
ing the examiners not to turn over any specific data or facts, such as times, dates, places,
names, etc., obtained in the interview, to the prosecution. As long as the prosecutors are
denied access to such incriminating data, the policy of the privilege, to prevent the use of
-information obtained during the examination in subsequent criminal proceedings against
the accused, would be satisfied and the objectionable use of the privilege avoided.
38. Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 (1895); Atkinson v. State, 190 Ind. 1, 128
N. E. 433 (1920) ; State v. Pence, 173 Ind. 99, 89 N. E. 488 (1909). In Bedgood v. State,
115 Ind. 275, 17 N. E. 621 (1888), a witness in a criminal trial was compelled to answer
a question which might have resulted in his conviction of a crime, due to the existence of
an immunity statute exempting witnesses from prosecution under these circumstances.
39. People v. Redlich, 402 Ill. 270, 83 N. E.2d 736, 741 (1949) ; People v. Chapman,
301 Mich. 584, 4 N. W.2d 18 (1943).
40. Noelke v. State, 214 Ind. 427, 15 N. E.2d (1938) ; State v. Coleman, 96 W. Va.
544, 123 S. E. 580 (1924) ; State v. Chandler, 126 S. C. 149, 119 S. E. 774 (1923) ; Blocker
v. State, 92 Fla. 878, 110 So. 547 (1926), are decisions rejecting the defendant's conten-
tion of privilege to exclude evidence obtained by psychiatric examination where the de-
fendant himself has introduced the defense of insanity. See also Countee v. United States,
112 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1940) ; Weihoffen, op. cit. supra, note 3 at 216-218. Closely re-
lated is the application of the privilege against self-incrimination to physical examina-
tions of the defendant. In People v. Esposito, 287 N. Y. 389, 39 N. E.2d 925 (1942) the
defendant pleaded insanity as a defense to a crime, the court holding that his constitutional
immunities were not violated by virtue of the fact that drugs were injected into him during
preliminary examination, since in presenting the defense of insanity he was subject to the
use of methods set up by the medical profession for the determination of such condition.
O'Brien v. State, 125 Ind. 38, 25 N. E. 137 (1890), held compulsory physical examination
to determine accused's identity was admissable as evidence. 24 ILL. L. REv. 487 (1929);
25 Micir. STATE B. J. 169 (1946) ; 74 N. Y. J. REv. 375 (1940).
41. Ind. Acts 1949, c. 124, § 4.
42. Id. § 5.
43. Where the jury form of trial has been preserved by statute, in commitment pro-
ceedings, some courts hold the appointment of physicians to examine the defendant void
as prejudicing the jury in favor of testimony given by court appointed examiners. People
v. Scott, 326 IIl. 327, 157 N. E. 247 (1927). Contra : Jessner v. State, 202 Wis. 194, 231
N. W. 634 (1930). Other courts merely refuse to admit the commissions' report as evi-
dence, but it is available to the parties concerned and may be introduced by summoning
the examiners at witnesses. MASS. ANN. LAWS (Supp. 1947), c. 123; 19 MINN. L. Ray.
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It is also competent, although not essential, to introduce evidence of the
commission of similar crimes together with the punishment inflicted and
such other evidence as bears on the person's condition. 44 A comparable pro-
vision in the Illinois statute was held to apply only to such crimes as tend
to show a sexual psychopathic condition since this was dearly the legislative
intent. Further, the Illinois court held that since it was not a criminal pro-
ceeding in which the accused is entitled to a trial free from evidence of
convictions theretofore had against him, the act was not invalid on that
ground.45
Under the Indiana, California and Minnesota statutes first offenders
as well as recidivists may be committed.4 6 Some states require prior conviction
of sex offenses and proof of the continued existence of such condition for a
specified period of time as a prerequisite of commitment. 7 While proof of
prior conviction may be an important aid to the court in determining the
defendant's mental state, such a requirement seems ancillary rather than
essential to the determination of this question. This safeguard was inserted
to prevent abuse by relatives or others and not for constitutional reasons.48
Indeed, Massachusetts, after once amending its act to require proof of prior
conviction, now permits commitment of defective delinquents on the first
offense if the court decides that the individual has serious recidivistic ten-
dencies. 49 Moreover, the requirement in other states that the prosecutor must
establish the continued existence of the psychotic condition for a specified
period of time, has created evidential problems and has prevented the desired
utilization of the statute.5" The absence of such a provision in the Indiana
statute eliminates this practical difficulty.
308 (1935) ; 25 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 859 (1935). Where the proceeding is by the
court without a jury such criticism fails and the report is directly admissable. People v.
Chapman, 301 Mich. 584, 4 N. W.2d 18 (1943).
44. Ind. Acts 1949, c. 124, § 5.
45. People v. Sims, 382 Ill. 472, 47 N. E.2d 703 (1943).
46. Ind. Acts 1949, c. 124, § 5; CALIF. WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS CODE, c. 4
(1944); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 526.09-526.11.
47. ILL. REV. STAT. (1947), c. 38, § 37.665(1); MICH. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1947) §
28.967(1).
48. 24 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 325 (1933).
49. See Note 13 supra.
50. The most serious defect in the present Illinois statute is the definition section
which limits its coverage to those persons charged with crime and having a mental dis-
order for more than one year prior to any action under the act; furthermore, the prosecu-
tor must prove criminal propensities toward the commission of sex crimes. As a result
of these stringent requirements the Act has been used sparingly and only sixteen persons
have been confined in the ten year period since its passage. The suggested revision to
the Illinois statute eliminates the necessity of a criminal charge and expands the defini-
tion of persons intended to be embraced by the act. 40 J. CRIm. L. & CRImINOLOGY 186




The Act provides that the hearing shall be conducted by the court without
a jury.51 Similar provisions in other statutes were unsuccessfully claimed
to be an abrogation of the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury 2 But
this right is preserved only in those civil actions triable by jury at common
law. 3 Consequently, since idiocy proceedings were conducted by the court
without a jury in early times, commitment proceedings for various conditions
where the legislature has eliminated trial by jury under the statute are held
not to deny due process. On this basis the Minnesota sexual psychopath
statute eliminating trial by jury was upheld in Pearson v. Probate Court of
Ramsey County, the court alluding to this constitutional guarantee as not
applying to a proceeding of the sort contemplated by the statute. It is
interesting to note that after a careful study of the result of the use of jury
trial for commitment of the insane in Illinois one writer observed that "during
the twenty years this law remained on the books, more sane persons were
declared insane by jury trial, as shown by the reports of institutions from
year to year, than were ever wrongfully committed under the earlier system."'
COMMITMENT
Following a finding that the defendant is a criminal sexual psychopath,
the act provides for an indefinite period of commitment, as do most insanity
and related statutes," subject to provisions for parole and discharge.5 6 Such
51. Ind. Acts 1949, c. 124, § 5. The Minnesota and Ohio Statutes make no provi-
sion for jury participation at the hearings. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 526.09-525.11; OHIO GEN.
CODE (Supp. 1947) §§ 13451-19-15451-23. California, Michigan and Wisconsin provide
for permissive use of the jury, if the defendant so desires. CALIF. WELFARE AND INSTITU-
TIONS CODE, c. 4 (1944); MICH. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1947) §§ 28.967(1)-28.967(9); Wis.
LAWS (1942), c. 459. While in Massachusetts the use of a jury is discretionary with the
court. MASS. ANN. LAWS (Supp. 1947), c. 123(a). Jury trial is mandatory under the
Illinois act. ILL. REv. STAT. (1947), c. 38, § 37.665(5).
52. State ex reL Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 205 Minn. 545, 287
N. W. 297 (1939), aff'd. 309 U. S. 270 (1939). See People v. Frontczak, 286 Mich. 51,
281 N. W. 534, 537 (1938) (dissenting opinion) ; 24 TEX. L. Rtv. 307 (1946).
53. INn. CONsT. Art. 1, § 20, provides that in all civil cases, the right of trial by jury
shall remain inviolate. The phrase civil cases, as used in this section, includes only ac-
tions triable by jury at common law. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Davis, 69 Ind.
App. 109, 121 N. E. 142 (1918) ; Wright v. Fultz, 138 Ind. 594, 38 N. E. 175 (1894),;
Lake Erie, W. & R. R. v. Heath, 9 Ind. 558 (1857).
54. Dewey, The Jury Law for Commitmzent of the Insane in Illinois, 69 Am. J. OF
INSANITY 571 (1913) ; The Supreme Court of the U. S. in Southern R. R. v. City of
Durham, 266 U. S. 178 (1924), denounced the use of jury trial in commitment proceed-
ings stating that "since it is typically the most public, most formal and most elaborate
form of judicial proceeding, the jury trial represents the extreme example of the un-
fortunate concomitants of judicial procedure in commitment cases." But see 25 IowA L.
REv. 156 (1940).
55. GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND CRIMINAL LAW (1925).
56. Ind. Acts 1949, c. 124, § 5.
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a period of commitment in the Michigan statute, was held not to violate the
constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment because it was
a civil proceeding rather than a criminal action.57  As stated by the Indiana
court in Kistler v. State,58 this inhibition is aimed at the kind and form of
punishment rather than the duration and amount thereof. In order to
effectuate the purpose of these statutes indefinite commitment would seem to
be essential.5"
CONCLUSION
Pervading the entire field of legislation dealing with this problem is a
recognition that among the flotsam of modern society, sexual offenders
require special consideration.60 Unless early institutionalization is provided
they will almost always repeat, and punishment does not alter this attitude.61
The modern view that sex crimes are not ordinary crimes, and that sex
offenders are not ordinary criminals with ordinary motives, has received
increasing support.62  Naturally these statutes present no panacean solution
to the problem, but they are a step in that direction. The underlying condition
demonstrating the relationship of the psychopath's past conduct to probable
future consequences is as susceptible of proof as many criteria required to
attain the pragmatic norm called justice.63 In an effort to frustrate the legisla-
tive attempt to provide for the care of these unfortunates unable to care for
themselves, the sexual psychopathic statutes of other states have been chal-
lenged most frequently under the due process clauses of the Federal and State
Constitutions. The substantive features of these statutes have been held, al-
most without exception, to be within the police power of the state; hence the
undoubted interference with personal liberty was not subject to constitutional
proscription. 64  Similar proceedings under habitual criminal65 and steriliza-
57. People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584, 4 N. W.2d 18 (1943).
58. 190 Ind. 149, 129 N. E. 625 (1921).
59. Cf. Ex parte Stone, 87 Cal. App.2d 907, 172 P.2d 847 (1948).
60. In 55 YALE L. J. 527 (1946), the author states that "to the average lawyer they
represent a class of individuals little known and rarely encountered. For this reason,
when legal precedent alone determines the outcome of litigation involving sexual of-
fenders, it may be a case of the blind leading the blind."
61. See Note 2 supra.
62. 32 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 366 (1941); 55 YALE L. J. 527 (1946).
63. Minnesota ex reL Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 309 U. S.
270 (1939).
64. This proposition has received general acceptance since the Supreme Court af-
firmed a sterilization proceeding, pursuant to a Virginia statute, in Buck v. Bell, 274
U. S. 200 (1926) ; In re Hendrickson, 12 Wash.2d 600, 123 P.2d 322 (1942). On the same
basis sexual psychopathic statutes have been sustained in State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate
Court of Ramsey County, 205 Minn. 545, 287 N. W. 297 (1939), aff'd, 309 U. S. 270
(1939) ; People v. Sims, 382 Ill. 472, 47 N. E.2d 703 (1943) ; People v. Chapman, 301
Mich. 584, 4 N. W.2d 18 (1943).
65. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns 1933) §§ 9-2207-9-2208; Barr v. State, 205 Ind. 481,
187 N. E. 259 (1933) ; Kelley v. State, 204 Ind. 612, 185 N. E. 453 (1933) ; De La Tour
v. State, 201 Ind. 14, 165 N. E. 753 (1929).
NOTE 195
tion acts66 have been upheld in Indiana and other jurisdictions, as have statutes
providing for commitment of the insaneG7 and feeble-minded. 8  In view of
the Indiana court's attitude toward the analogous proceedings mentioned and
the uniform manner in which the federal and state courts have upheld sexual
psychopathic statutes it is probable that the Indiana statute will not be invali-
dated as denying due process. There have been no legal arguments advanced
which would justify such an interference with the legislative pronouncement.
66. Williams v. Smith, 190 Ind. 526 (1921), held unconstitutional as denying pro-
cedural due process. INn. STAT. ANN. (Bums 1933) §§ 22-1601-22-1612, amended the
unconstitutional provisions of the foregoing act. Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200 (1926).
Skinner v. State ex rel. Williamson, 189 Okla. 235, 115 P.2d 123 (1941), held a state
ase.xualization statute valid. For a criticism of the Oklhaoma statute see 55 HARV. L. REV.
285 (1941). Davis v. Walton, 74 Utah 80, 123 P.2d 322 (1942).
67. See Note 8 supra.
68. See Note 9 supra.
